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Am I a “Licensed Liar”?: An Exploration into the Ethic of 
Honesty in Lawyering . . . and a Reply of “No!” to the 
Stranger in the La Fiesta Lounge 
Abstract.  After hearing for the first time the lawyer-disparaging phrase, 
“licensed liar,” the author investigated its significance.  This article presents 
the question of those two words’ meaning and explains how the author 
reached the conclusion that, as applied to attorneys, the phrase is an 
unmerited epithet. 
The phrase is known and utilized in nonlegal texts in fields such as fiction, 
poetry, literary criticism, and journalism, but the two words are absent from 
legal texts.  The author’s discovery of the phrase in various criticisms of 
lawyers in other publications illuminates and confirms that the phrase 
constitutes the pejorative allegation that an attorney will engage in 
prevarication for clients in exchange for compensation. 
In tracing the history of the question of lawyer honesty, this Article shows 
honesty to be a persistent ethical obligation.  When the essence of the 
phrase, a supposed willingness to speak untruths with deceptive intent for a 
fee, is compared to not only the persistently stated ethic of honesty in the 
practice of law, but also the reality of professional discipline that can result 
from violations, the phrase is seen to be an unjustified epithet. 
Author.  Josiah Daniel is a Partner in the law firm Vinson & Elkins L.L.P. 
in its Dallas, Texas office.  He has practiced law for nearly four decades and 
has authored articles proposing the definition, and demonstrating the 
concept, of “lawyering.”  He holds a B.A. in history from The University of 
the South; an M.A., also in history, from The University of Texas at Austin; 
and a J.D. from the latter university’s School of Law.  He wishes to thank 




inspiring this exploration of the utterance at issue in this Article.  The views, 
statements about the law, and ideas expressed in this Article do not 
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I. HEARING THE PHRASE “LICENSED LIAR” FOR THE FIRST TIME 
One evening during a vacation in Santa Fe, New Mexico, I enjoyed 
country music in the La Fiesta Lounge of the venerable La Fonda Hotel.  
After I stepped away for a few minutes, an unknown man approached my 
wife, took up her hand unexpectedly, and, pointing to her ring, asked, “What 
kind of work does your husband do?”  “He’s a lawyer,” she replied.  “No, 
he’s not!” exclaimed the stranger.  “He’s a licensed liar!” 
Just then I returned, the stranger quickly departed, and my wife reported 
his statement and its vehement tone.  I had never heard the phrase “licensed 
liar.”  Immediately it struck me as, at the least, a derogatory comment.  We 
grimaced and tried to laugh—lawyers and their spouses must have thick 
skins in an era in which lawyer jokes, legal-profession criticisms, and stories 
about attorneys accused of nefarious conduct1 recurrently ricochet through 
our email inboxes and reverberate across the media and Internet.  I 
wondered what the stranger’s utterance really meant. 
The man did not know me, so his words must have referred to the entire 
bar.  He spoke the two words as a phrase, so the past participle licensed and 
the noun liar were linked in an overall meaning, whatever it was.  Liar is 
obviously a pejorative term.  What exactly did his addition of the modifier 
licensed add to that already negative meaning?  Of course attorneys are aware, 
as public opinion polls over several decades have demonstrated, that the 
profession has a poor reputation for honesty and good ethics.2  But does 
admission to the organized bar in any way provide attorneys a “license to 
lie”?  Do lawyers deal and trade in falsehoods under the cover of our state-
granted law licenses?  And the stranger had gestured to my wife’s ring; that 
seemed to insinuate that attorneys willingly participate in prevarication for 
the sake of making money from clients. 
This Article recounts my exploration of these questions in all the texts 
and sources I could find and how I reached the conclusion that attorneys 
are not “licensed liars” and that the phrase is an unjustified epithet. 
 
 1. See Benjamin Weiser, Defending the Notorious, and Now Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013, at MB1 
(reporting the grievance proceedings and embezzlement allegations against “a prominent criminal 
defense lawyer in New York, [who] has long believed in doing whatever it takes to win a case, ‘going 
to the line,’ as he puts it — the line between putting on an aggressive defense and an unethical one”). 
 2. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 2:2 (2016), available 
at Westlaw (reflecting on a negative turn in the public perception of attorneys—beginning with the 
Watergate scandal—from which the profession has never substantially recovered). 
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II. RESEARCHING THE PHRASE 
To begin, I navigated my computer to those easy, all-purpose research 
methodologies: the Internet search engines Google3 and Bing.4  No 
definition of the phrase popped up, but search results included Internet 
message board postings that utilize the phrase “licensed liar” as a bitter 
criticism of attorneys by people who have been, in one way or another, 
disappointed in their personal experiences with attorneys.5  These 
references at least confirmed my contemporaneous sense that the phrase 
bears an uncomplimentary denotation and that the stranger in the bar was 
not the first person to call a lawyer a “licensed liar.” 
I checked other handy resources, Black’s Law Dictionary6 and the Dictionary 
of Modern Legal Usage,7 and I performed a search in Westlaw8 and Lexis9 for 
the two-word term in all federal and state statutes and case law, but it could 
not be found in those sources.  I could not find the phrase in any other 
dictionary,10 so I looked more broadly for a definition or indications of 
meaning in other texts. 
A. In Literary, Critical, and Journalistic Texts 
Pursuing deeper, full-text searches through Google Books11 and Google 
Scholar,12 and also utilizing conventional research methods in a university’s 
library of books printed on paper, my research uncovered multiple 
deployments of the term “licensed liar” in almost all genres and forms of 
English-language literature.  The largest number of results was found     in 
 
 3. GOOGLE, https://www.google.com (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
 4. BING, https://www.bing.com (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
 5. Such postings can be ephemeral.  The author has retained copies in his file of instances he 
found. 
 6. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 7. A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (1st ed. 2001). 
 8. The search was in the “Federal Cases” and “State Cases” databases.  WESTLAW, 
www.westlaw.com (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
 9.  The search was in the “Federal & State Cases, Combined” database.  LEXISNEXIS, 
www.lexis.com (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
 10. The phrase “licensed liar” does not appear in either of two dictionaries of slang.  See 
AMERICAN SLANG DICTIONARY (Richard A. Spears ed., 2007); see also AMERICAN SLANG (Barbara 
Ann Kipfer & Robert L. Chapman eds., 4th ed. 2008).  One near miss was finding the term used as a 
definition of a French phrase: “menteur patenté [is] literally and colorfully translated as ‘licensed liar.’”  
EUGENE EHRLICH, LES BONS MOTS: HOW TO AMAZE TOUT LE MONDE WITH EVERYDAY FRENCH 
203 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 11. GOOGLE BOOKS, http://books.google.com/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
 12. GOOGLE SCHOLAR, http://scholar.google.com/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
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the genre of fiction.  For instance, a Victorian-era short story titled The Beau’s 
Stratagem employed the phrase in describing a courtship ploy of the first-
person narrator.13  An instance from long fiction is Irving Bacheller’s early 
twentieth-century novel, “Charge It” or Keeping Up With Harry, in which the 
narrator remarks, “Of course I shall talk too much, but I am a licensed liar.”14 
Furthermore, I found the phrase used in literary criticism.  Most recently, 
a critic, Eefje Claassen, wrote, “The writer of fiction . . . is what some have 
called ‘a licensed liar’: in terms of truth-value, he is obviously lying.”15  In 
another example, the critic and historian Paul Johnson wrote of Mark Twain 
in his 2006 book CREATORS: 
Twain grasped . . . the essential immorality of storytelling.  A man telling a tale 
is not under oath.  He must insist, indeed he must insist, that his story is true.  
But this does not mean that it is true, or that it needs to be . . . .  A storyteller 
is a licensed liar.”16 
The novelist Margaret Atwood explained similarly: “All novelists are 
licensed liars.  They write down stories about people who don’t exist and 
events that never happened.”17  I found other examples of these literary 
 
 13. The Beau’s Stratagem: A Complete Story, in 12 ALL THE YEAR ROUND: A WKLY. J. CONDUCTED 
BY CHARLES DICKENS, Aug. 4, 1981 110, 110.  The narrator explains: 
I was ready to do or say anything that might help me to gain Miss Merton’s good opinion.  
Consequently when she asked if I liked children, I replied without hesitation in the 
affirmative . . . .  A lover is a licensed liar, and, therefore, it was without a scruple that I uttered a 
prompt, enthusiastic “Yes,” and waited for my reward in the shape of a smile or a few approving 
words.  But somehow my manner failed to convince Miss Merton, for she looked at me somewhat 
incredulously. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 14. IRVING BACHELLER, “CHARGE IT” OR KEEPING UP WITH HARRY 12 (1912). (emphasis 
added).  A more recent example: “It was the most unpleasant and stunning news of the entire argument.  
She coughed once, twice, then she answered, ‘Whoever gave you that information is a licensed liar.’”  
ANTONIO CASALE, WINDS OF LOVE 342 (2015) (emphasis added). 
 15. EEFJE CLAASSEN, AUTHOR REPRESENTATIONS IN LITERARY READING 106 (2012) 
(emphasis added). 
 16. PAUL JOHNSON, CREATORS: FROM CHAUCER AND DÜRER TO PICASSO AND DISNEY    
172–73 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 17. Margaret Atwood, Boundaries of the Imagination: Silencing the Scream, PROFESSION, 1994, at 44, 44 
(emphasis added).  A search of dissertations online turned up one that observes:  
[T]he category of fictional utterances does not obey the rules that apply to everyday speech, such 
as ‘“be truthful and sincere[.’]”  If speakers do not follow these rules they are considered to be 
lying, saying things that are false, mistaken, or pointless et cetera.  The writer of fiction, on the 
other hand, is what some have called “a licensed liar”; in terms of truth value he is obviously lying. 
ELISABETH HENRICA PETRONELLA MARIA CLAASSEN, THE AUTHOR’S FOOTPRINTS IN THE 
GARDEN OF FICTION: READERS’ GENERATION OF AUTHOR INFERENCES IN LITERARY READING 
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pieces.18 
Similarly, the literary critic Northrop Frye used the term “licensed liar” in 
describing other writers of fiction, the poets.  In one book he wrote, “[t]he 
apparently unique privilege of ignoring facts has given the poet his 
traditional reputation as a licensed liar.”19  Likewise, a British poet and critic, 
Sheenagh Pugh, has written of herself: “I am a licensed liar; it is my profession 
to embroider the truth and make it more interesting.”20  Moreover, the 
additional research discovered instances of writers applying the phrase 
pejoratively toward real, not fictional, persons.  In a 1998 book exploring 
the origins of the genre of science fiction literature, author Thomas M. 
Disch scorned the late nineteenth-century spiritual medium Helena 
Petrovna Blavatsky as a “charlatan of indomitable chutzpah” whose apologia 
pro vita sua21 was “[s]poken like a licensed liar!”22 
Journalism furnished examples.  In 1918, American journalist George 
Harvey reiterated the phrase in a sneering commentary published in the 
North American Review’s War Weekly23 that he styled as a response to a critical 
letter the publication had received from George Creel.24  Creel, also a 
 
91 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 18. See GEORGES DENIS ZIMMERMANN, THE IRISH STORYTELLER 565 (2000) (“The ‘licensed liar’ 
does not expect to be believed by the members of the community who have been socialized into seeing 
a joke and identifying deliberate assaults on credibility.”) (emphasis added); see also YINGJIN ZHANG, 
THE CITY IN MODERN CHINESE LITERATURE & FILM: CONFIGURATIONS OF SPACE, TIME, AND 
GENDER 52 (1996) (“[T]he storyteller [i]s a specially licensed liar.”) (emphasis added). 
 19. Northrop Frye, Ethical Criticism: Theory of Symbols, in NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF 
CRITICISM: FOUR ESSAYS 71, 75 (1957) [hereinafter Theory of Symbols] (emphasis added).  Another time, 
Frye wrote: “We can understand . . . how the poet got his reputation as a kind of licensed liar 
[because] . . . .  [t]he word poet itself means liar in some languages . . . .”  NORTHROP FRYE, THE 
EDUCATED IMAGINATION 34 (House of Anansi Press Ltd. 1963)  (emphasis added). 
 20. Sheenagh Pugh, Say What You See, SHEER POETRY, (emphasis added), http://
www.sheerpoetry.co.uk/gcse/sheenagh-pugh/say-what-you-see (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).  Kirby 
Farrell, however, writes that Shakespeare “aspires to be more than a vendor of words or a licensed 
liar . . . he wants to claim a certain truth, meaning or order for his art . . . .”  James L. Calderwood, 
Richard II: The Fall of Speech, in CRITICAL ESSAYS ON SHAKESPEARE’S RICHARD II 189, 194 (Kirby 
Farrell ed. 1999) (emphasis added). 
 21 Apologia pro vita sua, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2006) 
(defining as “defense of one’s life” or “written justification for one’s belief or course of conduct”). 
 22. THOMAS M. DISCH, THE DREAMS OUR STUFF IS MADE OF: HOW SCIENCE FICTION 
CONQUERED THE WORLD 55 (1998) (emphasis added).  A century earlier, a British memoirist similarly 
used the phrase when referring to “Persian diplomatists” as adept “in the perplexing arts and artifices 
which go to the making of the licensed liar.”  Wilfrid Sparroy, A Study in the Persian Apparatus, 
MACMILLAN’S MAG., May–Oct. 1900, at 337, 346 (emphasis added). 
 23. George Harvey, We Hear From Mr. Creel, N. AM. REV.’S WAR WKLY., Sept. 14, 1918, at 13, 16 
(“‘George Creel is a licensed liar’—Senator Reed.  Who licensed him?”).  
 24. See ALAN AXELROD, SELLING THE GREAT WAR: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN 
38 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS  [Vol. 7:32 
journalist, had served under President Woodrow Wilson as the head of the 
nation’s propaganda agency during World War I.  The editorialist stated: 
Nor at any time have we regarded Senator Reed’s depiction of Mr. Creel as a 
“licensed liar” as warranted.  Not only is there no statute providing for the 
issuance of licenses to prevaricators, but we have it upon the authority of 
trustworthy witnesses who have seen Mr. Creel disporting upon the beach that 
he does not wear the customary tag inscribed with his name, breed and place 
to be returned if found astray.25 
Much more recently, a British journalism professor, Ray Boston, writing 
about himself said, “being a journalist was like being a licensed liar or a wizard 
with words.”26 
Such references in literature, literary discourse, and journalism are 
interesting, understandable, and benignant—the phrase as used in literature 
and literary criticism seems fairly synonymous with the term “poetic 
license”—but only partially helpful to understand the meaning of the phrase 
spoken by the stranger to my wife in the hotel lounge in Santa Fe.  In none 
of those literary and journalistic quotations is the subject phrase directed 
toward a lawyer.  Rather, in each of those situations, novelists and poets are 
speaking (through their writings) untruths in the service of art, but the 
authors are acting for themselves as creators and communicators of verses, 
stories, and novels, or in criticism of such literary works.27  In the examples 
from journalism, the writer is either reporting someone else’s utterance as 
allegedly false,28 or applying the phrase “licensed liar” to himself to indicate 
 
PROPAGANDA 127–28 (2009) (describing Creel’s role as national censor in charge of the Creel 
Committee). 
 25. Harvey, supra note 23, at 16 (emphasis added).  Further research about the incident referred 
to by Harvey reveals that U.S. Senator David Aiken Reed called Creel a “licensed liar” during a Senate 
hearing in 1918 on the performance of American fighter planes during that just-concluded war.  Aircraft 
Failure Evidence Bared by the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1918, at 6 (“I think it is time that this licensed 
liar—and I use that term advisedly, for I know the gentleman and knew him before he came here—
should by his superiors have a bridle put upon him.”).  A search of the entire New York Times archive 
from 1851 to February 18, 2014, shows this report of the statement by Senator Reed to be the sole 
usage in that newspaper of the term under consideration.  However, Creel had been called a “licensed 
liar” even earlier.  See AXELROD, supra note 24, at 127 (“From the beginning, many in government 
opposed the elevation of a ‘radical journalist,’ a ‘campaign huckster,’ ‘depraved hack,’ and ‘licensed liar’ 
[Creel] to the post of national ‘censor.’” (emphasis added)). 
 26. Ray Boston, My Kind of Journalism, 13 BRIT. JOURNALISM REV., no. 1, 2002, at 60, 60. 
 27. E.g., JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 172–73  (“A man telling a tale is not under oath.  He may 
insist, indeed he must insist, that his story is true.  But this does not mean that it is true, or that it needs 
to be . . . A storyteller is a licensed liar.” (emphasis added)). 
 28. E.g., Theory of Symbols, supra note 19, at 75 (“The apparently unique privilege of ignoring the 
facts has given the poet his traditional reputation as a licensed liar.” (emphasis added)). 
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“wizard[ry] with words.”29 
B. In Lawyer-Related Literature 
The essence of what lawyers “do,” widely referred to as lawyering,30 can 
sometimes bear a similarity to creative writing.  But lawyering is 
fundamentally different from fiction writing, poesy, and journalism.  
Lawyers are good with words,31 but, significantly, a lawyer writes and speaks 
in the capacity of an “agent [who] invokes and manipulates, or advises about, 
the dispute-resolving or transaction-effectuating processes of the legal 
system for the purpose of solving a problem or causing a desired change in, 
or preserving, the status quo for his or her [client].”32  So my analysis turned 
to occurrences of the phrase directed to or about lawyers said to be speaking 
or communicating untruths in the course and scope of their capacity as legal 
representatives for clients. 
Textual searches turned up a half-dozen works of contemporary fiction 
in which the phrase “licensed liar” was employed—quite disparagingly—in 
direct reference to lawyers.  In a novel titled The Calling, author Karl Arthur 
applied the phrase invectively to an attorney: “But then again, she was a 
professionally-trained licensed liar, otherwise known as a common sewer-
dwelling lawyer.  And an incompetent one at best.”33 
Another recent novel, Aulus’ Dream of Parenthood by Jacques Guillaume, 
contains this dialog: 
Baby, do you know the key difference between a lawyer and a physician,” Ms. 
Valerie asked. 
 
 29. Boston supra note 26, at 60 (“[B]eing a journalist was like being a licensed liar or a wizard with 
words.” (emphasis added)). 
 30. Lawyer, Lawyering, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (1st ed. 1987).  But see 
Lawyering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (recognizing that lawyering can be used in the 
context of someone who is not a lawyer). 
 31. See JONATHAN SHAPIRO, LAWYERS, LIARS, AND THE ART OF STORYTELLING 8 (2016) 
(“Storytelling—what it is, why it matters, how to do it—is not, therefore, a metaphor for legal advocacy.  
It is legal advocacy itself.”); see also Linda E. Fisher, Truth as a Double-Edged Sword: Deception, Moral 
Paradox, and the Ethics of Advocacy, 14 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 89 (1989) (“Lawyers wield the power of 
language and affect the lives of clients in complex and difficult situations.”). 
 32. Josiah M. Daniel, III, A Proposed Definition of the Term “Lawyering”, 101 LAW LIBR. J. 207, 215 
(2009) (emphasis added); see also Robert K. Vischer, Moral Engagement Without the “Moral Law”: A Post-
Canons View of Attorneys’ Moral Accountability, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 213, 213 (2008) (“The primary 
objective, when it comes to lawyers, is to attain the client’s stated objectives to the extent permitted by 
law.”).  In 2014, Black’s substantially adopted my definition of the term “lawyering.”  Lawyering, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 33. KARL ARTHUR, THE CALLING 177 (2005) (emphasis added). 
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Sophie replied, “I have no clue, mom.” 
“Well, my dear, a lawyer is a licensed liar while a physician is a pathetic liar,” 
giggled Valerie. 
Sophie laughed . . . . Her mom’s joke was quite funny.34 
In another novel, Rose Hill, Reed M. Wolcott critically employed the 
phrase: “They shouldn’t come with a lawyer, a licensed liar, an’ fifty dollars 
an’ get the case thrown out.  I believe in put-tin’ teeth in the law an’ makin’ 
it bite.”35  These insulting usages are similar to some vituperative usages of 
the phrase “licensed liar” used in criticisms of attorneys I saw in Internet 
message board postings.36 
Other examples occur in recent nonfiction writings that are critical of 
lawyers.  One is in a diatribe titled Demons of Democracy: 
Those who dispense [justice] from the bench look with an oblique eye at 
anyone who defends himself without a licensed liar.  A pro se, someone who 
defends himself without an attorney, usually fails in his efforts before a court 
of law.  The primary reason is it would be the beginning of the end for the 
legal profession.37 
Another is contained in The Contractor Image, a do-it-yourself guide for 
building contractors: “As far as the legal wording, I can’t really dive into it 
too much, as I’m not a licensed liar, I mean lawyer.”38  In common with the 
quotations from contemporary novels, these references to lawyers, if not 
derogatory, are certainly disdainful. 
But much earlier, and more important for analysis of the utterance of the 
stranger in the LaFonda Hotel bar, a denunciatory application of the phrase 
was written in a nonfiction essay published 175 years ago by the important 
nineteenth-century British legal and political philosopher, Jeremy 
Bentham.39  As a part of his wide-ranging survey of English law, Bentham 
examined writ of error practice as it existed then in England; and in framing 
his conclusion, Bentham aimed the phrase in reproach of certain British 
lawyers: 
 
 34. JACQUES GUILLAUME, AULUS’ DREAM OF PARENTHOOD: PATIENCE, KINDNESS, 
COURAGE AND FORGIVENESS 31 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 35. REED M. WOLCOTT, ROSE HILL 278 (1976)(emphasis added). 
 36. Such postings can be ephemeral.  The author has retained copies in his file of instances he 
found. 
 37. MARK DAVIS, DEMONS OF DEMOCRACY 9 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 38. BRYAN LEE HEMSTAD, THE CONTRACTOR IMAGE: HOW TO CREATE AND MARKET AN 
AWESOME IMAGE IN TODAY’S WORLD 160 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 39. 7 JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 
(Russell & Russell 1962) (1838). 
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Writs of error [totaling] 1,809 in three years, whereof only 19 [were] argued.  
What is certain is, that, in the 1,790 in which there was no argument, the non-
existence of the alleged error was no less perfectly known to the licensed liar by 
whom the existence of it was asserted, than to his injured adversary.40 
Lawyers today can apprehend his criticism; he is emphasizing that his 
survey showed that the vast majority of appeals initiated by lawyers for 
unsuccessful litigants lacked any bona fide basis.41 
But in all my research, the most significant and disparaging application of 
the two-word locution to lawyers is in a book of verse, Black Beetles in Amber, 
published in 1892 by Ambrose Bierce.  In To An Insolent Attorney, Bierce 
wrote: 
Talk not of “hire” and consciences for sale— 
You whose profession ‘tis to threaten, rail, 
Calumniate and libel at the will 
Of any villain who can pay the bill— 
You whose most honest dollars all were got 
By saying for a fee “the thing that’s not!” 
To you ‘tis one, to challenge or defend; 
Clients are means, their money is an end. 
. . . . 
Happy the lawyer!—at his favored hands 
Nor truth nor decency the world demands. 
Secure in his immunity from shame, 
His cheek ne’er kindles with the tell-tale flame. 
His brains for sale, morality for hire, 
In every land and century a licensed liar!42 
Bierce was an American satirist, critic, poet, short story author, editor, 
and journalist in the decades following the Civil War; the lawyer about 
 
 40. Id. at 215 (emphasis added). 
 41. Id. 
 42. 5 AMBROSE BIERCE, To an Insolent Attorney, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF AMBROSE 
BIERCE: BLACK BEETLES IN AMBER 240, 241 (Gordian Press 1966) (1911)  (emphasis added).  Nine 
years later, a Bierce copycat paraphrased the key lines of “To an Insolent Attorney” without attribution in 
a short story: “You, sir, are a criminal advocate; it is your business to defend or prosecute, as your 
retainer bids; to shut your eyes to the verities and attempt to close others’ vision.  What are you but a 
licensed liar?”  Gelett Burgess, Lady Méchante, THE SMART SET: A MAGAZINE OF CLEVERNESS, 
Sept. 1900, reprinted in 2 THE SMART SET: A MAGAZINE OF CLEVERNESS, Jul.–Dec. 1900 at 53, 59. 
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whom he wrote, Hall McAllister, was not a fictional character but rather the 
best known and most financially successful attorney in California from the 
1850s through the 1880s.  McAllister’s spectacular defense of Adolf 
Spreckels for his brazenly attempted murder of Michael H. de Young, the 
editor of the San Francisco Chronicle, incensed Bierce.43 
Bierce’s lines, accessible in libraries today,44 correspond with the sense 
and the vehemence with which the stranger at the bar in Santa Fe voiced 
the phrase to my wife.45  It was meant as a disparagement, even an 
opprobrium.  To an Insolent Attorney is the fullest expression my research 
found of the averment that, for money (“at the will / Of any villain who can 
pay the bill”46), and in disregard for principles of morality (“His cheek ne’er 
kindles with the tell-tale flame”47), a lawyer will even stoop to telling lies in 
the service of a paying client (“saying for a fee ‘the thing that’s not!’”).48 
 
 43. JAMES D. HART, A COMPANION TO CALIFORNIA 293 (1987).  McAllister was a lawyer whose 
“aristocratic style, logical reasoning, and thoroughness made him a famous figure before juries” and 
received larger fees than all other contemporary California attorneys.  Id.  His professional and civic 
reputation survived the attack of Bierce: “[a] San Francisco street is named for him. Id.  Additionally, 
the attorney is memorialized by a statue at San Francisco’s city hall with the inscription “HALL 
MCALLISTER/LEADER OF THE CALIFORNIA BAR/LEARNED ABLE 
ELOQUENT/FEARLESS ADVOCATE/A COURTEOUS FOE.”  Hall McAllister, (sculpture), 




&index=.OW&term=76004807&index=.NW (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
 44. Bierce’s usage of “licensed liar” is probably the most significant usage directed at attorneys as 
confirmed by one book including the phrase, under the heading “Lawyers,” as part of the last six lines 
of To an Insolent Attorney.  FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL 
QUOTATIONS 277 (1993).  In addition to Bierce’s works that many university libraries continue to 
shelve, To an Insolent Attorney, or excerpts containing the subject phrase, are available in reference works 
such as Ambrose Bierce, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POETRY THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (Eric 
L. Haralson ed., 1998).  Bierce’s verse, including the subject piece, is also republished in works such as 
POEMS OF AMBROSE BIERCE 94 (M.E. Grenander ed., 1995). 
 45. Consistently, Bierce wrote in his later book, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY, that a “liar” is merely 
a “lawyer with a roving commission.”  AMBROSE BIERCE, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 7 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF AMBROSE BIERCE: THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY 191, 191 (Neale Publishing Co. 1911). 
 46. BIERCE, supra note 42, at 241. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  Completing my literature search on HEINONLINE, http://www.heinonline.org (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2016), I turned up the sole relevant article in legal journals in which the two-word 
phrase is used.  J. Gordon Hylton dissected Bierce’s antipathy to the legal profession: “He was 
vituperative against judges . . . and above all lawyers.”  J. Gordon Hylton, The Devil’s Disciple and the 
Learned Profession: Ambrose Bierce and the Practice of Law in Gilded Age America, 23 CONN. L. REV. 705, 711 
(1990) (quoting 5 AMBROSE BIERCE, To an Insolent Attorney, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF AMBROSE 
BIERCE: BLACK BEETLES IN AMBER 240, 241 (Gordian Press 1966) (1911)).  However, while he 
quoted from “To An Insolent Attorney,” including the lines “In every land and century a licensed liar!,”  
Hylton did not discuss the two-word phrase “licensed liar.”  Id. 
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III. PARSING THE PHRASE 
Having completed my survey of incidences of “licensed liar” in available 
literature, I continued my investigation by parsing the two terms that 
comprise the phrase. 
A. “Liar” 
The stranger in the bar must have known the noun “liar,” standing alone, 
clearly has a quite negative denotation.  Dictionaries concur that the essential 
elements of liar’s definition are the telling of an untruth.  Black’s does not 
define “liar” but it does define “lie” in two ways: (1) “[a] false statement or 
other indication that is made with knowledge of its falsity”; and (2) “an 
untruthful communication intended to deceive.”49  In both definitions, the 
key element is intentional falseness or untruthfulness; but in the second 
definition, the speaker’s intention is “to deceive.”50  Black’s supports its 
definition with a quotation from Neil MacCormick’s 2008 book, Practical 
Reason in Law and Morality,51 which explains that a lie is not based on a 
mistake or made in jest, but rather “the speaker must intend the statement 
seriously, or at least realize that the addressee . . . will reasonably assume that 
it is being made seriously.”52 
Employing Westlaw53 and Lexis54 once again in a search for the noun 
“liar,” I found a judicial explanation of the noun “liar,” centering on the first 
definition provided by Black’s, in the 1990 libel case Milkovich v. Lorain Journal 
Co.55  There, Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote: “If a speaker says, ‘In 
my opinion John Jones is a liar,’ he implies a knowledge of facts which lead 
to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth.”56  A scan of other federal and 
state case law indicates use of the word “liar” in arguments at a trial is a 
reversible error in some situations57 and not in others,58 but “liar” is 
 
 49. Lie, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 50. Id. 
 51. NEIL MACCORMICK, PRACTICAL REASON IN LAW AND MORALITY (2008) 
 52. Lie, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (quoting NEIL MACCORMICK, PRACTICAL 
REASON IN LAW AND MORALITY 69 (2008)). 
 53. WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
 54. LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexis.com (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
 55. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 56. Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 
 57. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 934 F. Supp. 724, 729 (E.D. Va. 1996) (explaining the “line 
between permissible and impermissible use of the terms is drawn by reference to whether they are used 
in a context intended either to convey . . . personal opinion or to suggest . . . [the existence of] extra-
judicial information regarding the credibility of a defendant or witness”). 
 58. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 841 (Tex. 1979) (holding the accusations 
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uniformly regarded as at least an epithet.  The legal literature confirms that 
understanding.  The Restatement of Torts comments that “liar” is at least an 
“insult.”59 
Under these authorities, the irreducible element of the definition of “liar” 
is the speaking or communicating of an untruth; but the word “liar” also 
conveys an assertion of deceptive intent on the part of the speaker.60  
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, for example, defines “lie” as meaning 
“to make an untrue statement with intent to deceive.”61  Thus, the full 
meaning of one who speaks a lie includes a significant admixture of 
reprehensibility and condemnation.  As the philosopher Harry G. Frankfurt 
wrote, “the liar tries to mislead us into believing that the facts are other than 
they actually are.”62 
Another philosopher, Don Fallis, posited this definition of “lie”: 
You lie to X if and only if: 
(1) You state that p to X. 
(2) You believe that you make this statement in a context where the following 
norm of conversation is in effect: 
Do not make statements that you believe to be false. 
(3) You believe that p is false.63 
As a third philosopher and linguist, S. Morris Engel, has put the analysis 
into a syllogism: 
[A]n epithet like “Liar!” hurled at someone is in essence an argument—
and a formally valid one at that.  For, unpacked, what it contains is the 
 
made by Standard Fire did not alter the jury’s verdict, which was “a “careful verdict upon the basis of 
the evidence”).  One commentator has written, “[i]t cannot be said, therefore, that counsel 
may . . . freely refer to him as a ‘liar.’  Rather, the effect of the remark must be analyzed in light of the 
totality of the argument.”  Harry Caldwell, Name Calling at Trial: Placing Parameters on the Prosecutor, 8 AM. 
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 385, 387 (1985). 
 59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d, illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“A calls 
her . . . a God Damned liar . . . .  A’s conduct, although insulting, is not so outrageous or extreme to 
make A liable to B.”).  Moreover, psychologists have characterized the word “liar” as an “aggressive 
epithet.”  See James M. Driscoll, Aggressiveness and Frequency-of-Aggressive-Use Ratings for Pejorative Epithets 
by Americans, 114 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 111, 119 (1981) (rating 316 pejorative epithets, including “liar,” for 
aggressiveness and “frequency-of-aggressive-use”). 
 60. See Lie, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “lie” as “an untruthful 
communication intended to deceive”). 
 61. Lie, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2006). 
 62. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON TRUTH 77 (2006) (emphasis added); see also HARRY G. 
FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT 7–8 (2005) (“[A] lie . . . requires that the liar makes his statement in a 
certain state of mind—namely, with an intention to deceive.”). 
 63. Don Fallis, What is Lying?, 106 J. PHIL. 29, 34 (2009). 
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following reasoning: 
All people who try to deceive others by uttering what they know to be false 
are liars. 
You are such a person. 
Therefore you are a liar.64 
Clearly, these sources agree the noun “liar” is an assertion that assigns a 
deceptive intent to the speaker in her utterance of a falsehood. 
B. “Licensed” 
The adjectival addition of the past participle “licensed” intensifies the 
negative denotation of the phrase “licensed liar” as applied to lawyers 
because they hold a license or governmental authorization to do and say 
certain things on behalf of clients in certain fora, or more broadly within the 
legal system, that unlicensed persons cannot.65  Statutes and dictionaries 
provide relevant and useful definitions of the noun “license.” 
For instance, as the Supreme Court noted in the Arizona immigration 
case,66 Congress provided a broad definition of the term “license” in Title 5 
of the United States Code: “‘license’ includes the whole or a part of an 
agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, 
statutory exemption[,] or other form of permission.”67  Black’s defines 
“license” as “[a] privilege granted by a state or city upon the payment of a 
fee, the recipient of the privilege then being authorized to do some act or 
series of acts that would otherwise be impermissible.”68  It adds the 
subsidiary definition of “[t]he certificate or document evidencing such 
permission.”69  Thus “licensed” means “[h]aving official permission to do 
something, usu[ally] as evidenced by a written certificate.”70  Webster’s 
Dictionary defines the noun “license” as “a right or permission granted in 
accordance with law . . . to engage in some business or occupation, to do 
some act, or to engage in some transaction which but for such license would 
 
 64. S. MORRIS ENGEL, FALLACIES AND PITFALLS OF LANGUAGE: THE LANGUAGE TRAP 14 
(1994) (emphasis added). 
 65. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 81.051 (West 2013) (requiring Texas lawyers to be licensed to 
practice law in the state). 
 66. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 595–96 (2011) (discussing similar 
definitions of “license” as set forth by both Arizona law and Congress). 
 67. 5 U.S.C. § 551(8) (2012). 
 68. License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Licensed, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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be unlawful.”71 
Pertinent to attorneys, the adjective “licensed” must refer to their law 
licenses, which are the certificates demonstrating they have been granted the 
right to practice law and that generally provide membership in the “bar.”  
The legal profession is regulated through the mechanics of licensure and bar 
membership in each state and the District of Columbia.72  Years ago I wrote 
about the history of the “incorporation” of, or enactment of mandatory 
membership for attorneys in, the formerly voluntary Texas statewide bar 
organization under the State Bar Act of 1939.73  All attorneys who receive 
a license to practice law from the Supreme Court of Texas must be, and 
automatically and involuntarily are, members of the statewide bar 
organization, and the same is more or less true in all of the states.74  In 
short, to practice law—that is, to be authorized to serve clients as attorneys, 
to represent them in the legal system, and to charge them fees for those 
services—one must hold a license from a state government or from a unitary 
or mandatory bar association of the relevant state.75  Whether viewed as an 
asset of its holder or as a predicate to the lawyer’s practice, a law license 
clearly is a valuable thing.76 
To complete the syntactic analysis, putting the two words—licensed and 
liar—back together, the phrase must mean, in a derogating fashion, that a 
practicing attorney at law speaks or uses untruths with deceptive intentions 
in the attorney’s work on behalf of a client who pays fees, and that the 
attorney’s state law license enables or permits such false speech.  This 
analysis comports with the versified allegation of Bierce and for me, it 
completed the explication of the meaning the stranger in the lounge must 
have attached to the two-word phrase he spoke to my wife. 
IV. SEARCHING FOR REQUIREMENTS OF ATTORNEY HONESTY IN LAW-
PRACTICE TEXTS 
But is the “licensed liar” scorn of Bierce and utterance of the stranger in 
the La Fiesta Lounge objectively correct—now or in the past, and to any 
 
 71. License, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002). 
 72. E.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE § 81.051 (West 2013) (indicating bar membership is required to 
practice law in the state of Texas). 
 73. Josiah M. Daniel, III, Creating the State Bar of Texas, 1923-1940, 42 TEX. B.J. 454 (1982) 
[hereinafter Creating the State Bar of Texas]. 
 74. See GOV’T § 81.051(b) (requiring anyone who is licensed to practice law to enroll in the state 
bar). 
 75. See id. § 81.102 (noting no one may practice law without being a member of the state bar). 
 76. See Robert F. Reilly, Valuation of Licenses and Permits, INSIGHTS, Autumn 2014, at 53, 64–65 
(2014) (discussing the value given to professional licenses when “they are at issue in a family law 
matter”). 
2016] Am I a “Licensed Liar”? 47 
47 
extent—when applied to practicing attorneys?  Turning my research, finally, 
to legal ethics and the question of honesty,77 I located four relevant law-
practice texts.  The first is contemporary, and the others are historical. 
A. In the Current Ethical Regime of the Texas Bar 
A major purpose of regulating the practice of law through the granting of 
licenses to attorneys and mandatory membership in a statewide bar 
association is the application and enforcement of disciplinary rules.78  
Texas, as in other states, has a statewide bar organization that operates as an 
agency of the judicial branch.79  The State Bar has sought and obtained 
adoption of an extensive set of rules for ethical attorney conduct by the 
Texas Supreme Court.80  I reviewed the State Bar of Texas’s currently 
effective rules of legal ethics and called the Texas Disciplinary Rules of 
Professional Conduct (DRs),81 for specific rules that might speak most 
pertinently to the stranger’s “licensed liar” statement. 
Several key DRs, and their accompanying, aspirational comments, 
provide a present-tense answer to the question.  The DRs contain several 
proscriptions of dishonesty by attorneys.82  To begin, the first section of 
the Preamble to the DRs states: 
A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a 
 
 77. I adopt the distinction of the noun “ethics” articulated by Professor Carol Rice Andrews: 
“[Ethics are] standards of conduct for a profession [rather than] aspirational or moral ideals.”  Carol Rice 
Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1385 n.3 (2004) 
(emphasis added). 
 78. As presently stated, the requirement in Texas is: 
Bar Membership Required.  
(a) The state bar is composed of those persons licensed to practice law in this state. Bar members 
are subject to this chapter and to the rules adopted by the supreme court. 
 (b) Each person licensed to practice law in this state shall, not later than the 10th day after the 
person’s admission to practice, enroll in the state bar by registering with the clerk of the supreme 
court. 
GOV’T § 81.051. 
 79. Id. §§ 84.001–.004. 
 80. Id. §§ 84.001–.004. 
 81. Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, 
app. A (West 2013) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9). 
 82. In addition, the State Bar of Texas has created a “‘client’s security fund’ in Texas [as] a means 
through the collective efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a 
result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer.”  Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.14 cmt. 5 (emphasis 
added). 
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public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.  Lawyers, 
as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society.  The 
fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their 
relationship with and function in our legal system.  A consequent obligation of 
lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.83 
The Preamble articulates the foundational concept of what is often 
referred to as legal professionalism,84 the notion that an attorney is not 
solely an agent for a principal but also is an officer of the legal system and a 
citizen with heightened responsibility—to maintain the highest standards of 
ethical conduct—both to the client and to the public.85 
The DRs themselves, illuminated by the comments that were also 
approved by the Texas Supreme Court, make honesty a crucial, required, 
and specific element of the ethical obligation of an attorney, both to her 
client and to the client’s opponent or counterparty.86  As to the client, the 
rules require that an attorney “provide[] a client with an informed understanding 
of the client’s legal rights and obligations” and negotiate on behalf of a client 
“consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others.”87  It is true that “a 
lawyer should zealously pursue clients’ interests”88 which may be part of the 
antagonism embedded in the phrase “licensed lawyer.”  The lawyer is 
working to accomplish a result, causing a desired change or protecting the 
status quo, for the client;89 but that professional zeal is to be exercised 
 
 83. Id. preamble ¶ 1.  The Texas version of the preamble deviates in wording and style but not in 
substance from the Preamble of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  Compare MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983), with Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l 
Conduct preamble. 
 84. Legal professionalism is an “elusive concept,” with “overlapping uses” including as a 
description of “a profession as a distinct kind of occupation characterized by such features as special 
educational and licensing requirements; elements of nonmarket regulation, often in the hands of an 
occupational body rather than the state itself; and an announced ethos of public service” as an 
explanation why there is a “need for professions as nonmarket means of organizing certain 
occupations” and as assuring “that the unqualified do not deliver services and that the qualified deliver 
them as promised and at an appropriate level of quality”; as the “locus of regulation”; and as the “focus 
of aspiration.”  Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
259, 270–75 (1995). 
 85. The Preamble notes that the DRs establish “minimum standards of conduct below which no 
lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action” and that “[e]ach lawyer’s own conscience 
is the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his actions may rise above the disciplinary 
standards prescribed by these rules.”  Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct preamble ¶¶ 7, 9.  
 86. See id. at ¶ 2 (requiring lawyers to conduct honest dealings). 
 87. Id. (emphasis added).  According to the Preamble, this requirement facially applies not only 
professionally, but also in all aspects of life.  Id. at ¶ 4 (“[C]onduct should conform to the requirements 
of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs.”). 
 88. Id. at ¶ 3 (emphasis added). 
 89. Daniel, supra note 32, at 215–16 (expounding the results a lawyer seeks to gain for a client). 
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“within the legal system.”90  “A lawyer should use the law’s procedures only 
for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others.”91  In 
general, DR 8.04 provides, “[a] lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”92 
Moreover, and also relevant to the “licensed lawyer” allegation, the Texas 
rules demand honesty of the attorney in his communications—both 
affirmatively stated and implicitly or unstated—with judges and other 
tribunals.  Rule 3.03, titled “Candor Toward the Tribunal,” provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; 
(2) fail to disclose a fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid 
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act; 
(3) in an ex parte proceeding, fail to disclose to the tribunal an unprivileged 
fact which the lawyer reasonably believes should be known by that entity 
for it to make an informed decision; 
(4) fail to disclose to the tribunal authority in the controlling jurisdiction 
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client 
and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or 
(5) offer or use evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.93 
Additionally, if she has offered false evidence and then learns of it, the 
lawyer must seek “to persuade the client to authorize the lawyer to correct 
or withdraw the false evidence”; if such efforts are unsuccessful, the lawyer 
“shall take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure of the true 
facts.”94 
Furthermore, “[l]egal argument based on a knowingly false representation 
of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal, according to the Texas 
Disciplinary Rules.”95  And with limited exceptions, “a lawyer having 
knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of applicable rules 
of professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform 
the appropriate disciplinary authority.”96 
 
 90. Id. at 215. 
 91. Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct preamble ¶¶  3, 4. 
 92. Id. R. 8.04(a)(3). 
 93. Id. R. 3.03(a) (emphasis added). 
 94. Id. R. 3.03(b) (emphasis added). 
 95. Id. R. 3.03 cmt. 3 (emphasis added). 
 96. Id. R. 8.03(a) (emphasis added). 
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A catchall rule provides simply, “A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”97  Finally, the oath of 
office a newly admitted Texas attorney must take, confirms the obligation 
of honesty, integrity, and civility in law practice, as a result of a 2015 
legislative amendment: 
Section 82.037(a) Each person admitted to practice law shall, before receiving 
a license, take an oath that the person will: . . . 
(2) honestly demean oneself in the practice of law; 
(3) discharge the attorney ‘s duty to the attorney ‘s client to the best of 
the attorney ‘s ability; and 
(4) conduct oneself with integrity and civility in dealing and 
communicating with the court and all parties.98 
Honesty is a key element of that new statutory oath. 
Perhaps the stranger in the La Fiesta Lounge was thinking of criminal 
defense attorneys, such as the lawyer particularly scorned by Bierce in To an 
Insolent Attorney.99  Criminal defense attorneys are particularly reviled by 
many people because they defend not only the innocent but also “guilty 
criminals who have committed acts of violence or depravity.”100  Yet, a 
lawyer that enters a not guilty plea on behalf of a client is not lying under 
the DRs, but rather speaking to the court as an agent of the client.101  This 
is true even if the defense attorney is fully aware her client did in fact commit 
the act for which he is criminally charged.102 
Moreover, and significantly for present purposes, “[a] lawyer shall not 
assist or counsel a client to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows is 
criminal or fraudulent.”103  Indeed, “[w]hen a lawyer has confidential 
information clearly establishing that a client is likely to commit a criminal or 
fraudulent act that is likely to result in substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another,” the lawyer must take reasonable steps to 
 
 97. Id. R. 8.04(a)(3) (emphasis added).  “ʻFraud’ . . . denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive 
and not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.”  Id. 
terminology. 
 98. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 82.037(a) (West Supp. 2016) (emphasis added).  
 99. See 5 AMBROSE, supra note 42. 240–41 (showing contempt for a criminal lawyer who is willing 
to lie for his client as long as he gets paid).  
 100. Preface to HOW CAN YOU REPRESENT THOSE PEOPLE? ix, ix (Abbe Smith & Monroe 
Freedman, eds., 2013). 
 101.  Daniel, supra note 32, at 213 (“The lawyer-client relationship is one speicies of the broad 
agent-principal relationship.). 
 102. See Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.02(a)(3) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s 
decisions . . . [i]n a criminal case . . . as to a plea to be entered”). 
 103. Id. R. 1.02(c) (emphasis added). 
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dissuade the client from doing so.104  The fine points of the rule are difficult 
and overlain with defendants’ constitutional rights, but the basic rule is fairly 
clear.105 
The existence of the DRs does not mean every attorney is not and will 
never become a liar.  They do provide disciplinary penalties that can range 
from private reprimands to disbarment for those who violate the ethical 
rules.  Each issue of the State Bar’s official journal contains short reports of 
discipline administered by the organization or by a court to violators of the 
rules.106  If all lawyers violated the system of ethical rules willy-nilly, the 
system could not function.  While it does not work perfectly, the system 
does work in a reasonably adequate manner.107 
The existence of the State Bar of Texas’s ethical rules rebuts the allegation 
that admission to the practice of law is any sort of a license to lie.  But has 
it always been so?  I forged ahead with my research, reaching back into 
earlier ethical literature of the legal profession. 
B. In Historical American Legal-Ethical Texts 
Justice Samuel Alito wrote: “it’s difficult to talk about where we are now 
and where we are going without knowledge of the evolution of the ethical 
standards that presently govern us as lawyers.”108  The Texas DRs of today 
are substantially based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, initially 
promulgated by the American Bar Association (ABA) in 1983109 and 
 
 104. Id. R. 1.02(d). 
 105. See Bertrand C. Moser, Client Perjury: The Lawyer’s Dilemma, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 263, 274 (1987) 
(discussing the interaction between a defendant’s constitutional rights and the rules attorneys must 
follow). 
 106. See, e.g., Disciplinary Actions, 79 TEX. B.J. 595, 642 (2016) (reporting an attorney as disbarred 
for committing egregious fraud while representing his client by collecting money from investors, 
commingling the investors’ funds with his own, and using the investment funds for his own benefit). 
 107. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT  preamble ¶ 12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (declaring it 
is a lawyers’ responsibility to follow the rules and aid in the self-regulation of the profession to ensure 
protection of public interest). 
 108. Samuel Alito, Introduction to A CENTURY OF LEGAL ETHICS: TRIAL LAWYERS AND THE ABA 
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS xxix, xxix  (Lawrence J. Fox et al. eds., 2009). 
 109. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  The history of American legal 
ethics from the ABA’s issuance of the Model Code in 1969 through fourteen years of formulation to 
the promulgation of the Model Rules in 1983, was a process Professor Michael Ariens described as 
“the elimination of guiding standards in favor of bright-line rules” and a transformation from a 
widespread sensibility that lawyers owe a duty to the public to the “law of lawyering.”  Michael Ariens, 
The Last Hurrah: The Kutak Commission and the End of Optimism, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 689, 692, 733, 
737 (2016) [hereinafter The Last Hurrah].  He explains and laments the change from “optimism in the 
American legal profession” and the “idea of the lawyer as a servant of the public” under the prior 
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adopted by order of the Supreme Court of Texas in 1989, effective 
January 1, 1990,110 under the name Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional 
Conduct.111  I recalled that those DRs were preceded by DRs based on the 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility that the ABA issued in August 1969,112 
 
ethical regime to a “private market model of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the client” under the Model 
Rules.  Id. at 691–92; see also Michael S. Ariens, Sorting Legal: Specialization and the Privatization of the 
American Legal Profession, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 579, 594–99 (2016) (re-emphasizing the obvious 
shift from a public interest focus to a “market” model relationship). 
 110. The State Bar of Texas began considering the Model Rules in 1984, but its membership 
required some modifications and the Texas Supreme Court did not adopt the rules, as adapted, until 
1989.  The Last Hurrah, supra note 109, at 691 n.12.  As a result, the Texas ethical rules are stricter than 
the ABA’s recommended rules in a few respects, such as attorney advertising.  Compare Tex. 
Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 7.07, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A 
(West 2013) (outlining the requirements for a lawyer to obtain approval for public advertisements and 
solicitations), with ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 244 (1942) (finding a 
lawyer’s advertisement for a full-time position did not violate any ethics codes), and MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1 (“A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the 
lawyer or the lawyer’s services.”). 
 111. Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct (1989), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, 
subtit. G, app. A (Vernon Supp. 1995) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9).  Texas attorneys also practice in 
federal courts, which hold “inherent power to regulate the practice of counsel appearing before the 
[c]ourt[s].”  In re Fahey, No. 09–00501, 2009 WL 2855728 at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2009); see 
also Wright v. United States (In re Placid Oil Co.), 158 B.R. 404, 411 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993) (holding 
a bankruptcy court maintained inherent authority to discipline attorneys practicing before the court); 
Cunningham v. Ayers (In re Johnson), 921 F.2d 585, 586 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding a bankruptcy court 
had both “statutory and inherent authority to deny attorneys and others the privilege of practicing it”).  
“Fifth Circuit precedent requires the court to consider several relevant ethical standards in determining 
whether there has been an ethical violation.”  Galderma Lab., L.P. v. Actavis Mid Atl. LLC, 927 
F. Supp. 2d 390, 394 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (including both state and national ethical standards); see also 
FDIC v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 1304, 1312 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating “parties cannot be deprived of 
their right to counsel on the basis of local rules alone” (citation omitted)); In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 
972 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating a trial court should first determine whether the attorney’s 
behavior prejudiced the client or “threatened interference with the fair administration of justice); In re 
Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1992) (indicating federal courts should also consider 
“the ethical rules announced by the national profession in the light of the public interest and the 
litigants’ rights”).  Local rules of certain district courts explicitly adopt the ethical rules of the state: 
(b) Grounds for Disciplinary Action.  A presiding judge, after giving opportunity to show cause 
to the contrary, may take any appropriate disciplinary action against a member of the bar for: . . . 
unethical behavior; . . . . 
(e) Unethical Behavior.  The term “unethical behavior,” as used in this rule, means conduct 
undertaken in or related to a civil action in this court that violates the Texas Disciplinary Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
N.D. Tex., Civ. R. 83.8 (emphasis added); see generally E.D. Tex., Civ. R. AT-2; S.D. Tex., Civ. R. 83.1, 
app’x. A; W.D. Tex., Civ. R. AT-7. 
 112. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969).  The ABA’s Model Code 
and Model Rules are simply models for adoption by the relevant authorities of the states.  Interpretation 
of the ABA models provide guidance for application of state rules.  Accordingly, “[s]ince 1983 almost 
all of the states have adopted some form of the ABA Model Rules.  The others use a version of the 
Model Code.  California is the only state that has never adopted either model and has its own rules of 
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which Texas adopted with some modification in 1973.113  My comparison 
of the Texas rules adopted in 1973 with those implemented in 1990 
demonstrated that requirements regarding attorney honesty were previously 
more pithily stated, but clearly the essence has subsisted. 
I continued researching in reverse chronological order.  The Texas ethical 
standards preceding 1973 originated half a century earlier.  In 1926, the 
Texas Bar Association, the predecessor of today’s State Bar of Texas,114 
approved its original set of legal ethics for Texas attorneys, or at least 
applicable to those who were members of the voluntary association.  The 
set of ethical precepts that the Texas Bar Association adopted at that time 
had been propounded by the ABA in 1908, in the Canons of Professional 
Ethics.115  The Texas Lawyers’ Association had been mulling the matter for 
almost two decades, having received the very first iteration of professional 
ethics at the time the ABA had promulgated them.116 
It was between 1905 and 1908 that the ABA developed its Canons.  “The 
traditional story” is that President Theodore Roosevelt, in a 1905 address at 
Harvard Law School, “criticized the legal profession for following the ethics 
of the marketplace instead of higher principles of morality.”117  He 
encouraged the bar to restrain unprofessional behavior and “to raise the 
standard of conduct for all lawyers.”118  The ABA spent two years studying, 
drafting, and seeking comments, and on August 27, 1908, the organization 
adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics.119  Review of the 1908 version 
discloses that, from the outset, the ABA Canons urged truthfulness in 
speech on the part of a lawyer and the element of honesty was central to 
 
professional responsibility.”  Legal Ethics, DUKE UNIV. SCH. OF L., J. MICHAEL GOODSON L. LIBR., 
https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/lib/legalethics.pdf (last modified Aug. 2015) [hereinafter 
Legal Ethics].  
 113. TEX. SUP. CT., RULES GOVERNING THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS art. X, § 9 (Code of 
Professional Responsibility) (1973). 
 114. The Texas Bar Association existed from 1882 to 1940, at which time it was more or less 
engrafted onto the judicial branch of state government by virtue of the 1939 State Bar Act.  See Creating 
the State Bar of Texas, supra note 73, at 456–57 (reviewing the history leading up to the State Bar Act). 
 115. Legal Ethics, supra note 112. 
 116. As noted next, the ABA adopted its Canons in 1908; and a year later, in Texas, a committee 
recommended that the Texas Bar Association adopt them.  A.H. McKnight, Proceedings at the Independent 
Meeting of the Texas Bar Ass’n, 4 TEX. L. REV. 161, 193–200 (1926).  However, no vote was taken in 
1909 or subsequently, and although some members thought that the Association had adopted the 
Canons, the Association did not in fact do so until 1926.  Id. 
 117. Judith S. Kaye, Keynote Address: ABA Canons of Professional Ethics Centennial, 2008 J. PROF. 
LAW. 7, 8 (2008). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  
54 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS  [Vol. 7:32 
several key canons. 
Canons 15 and 22 are particularly germane: 
Canon 15.  How Far a Lawyer May Go in Supporting a Client’s Cause. 
The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for 
any client, . . . any manner of fraud or chicane.120 
Canon 22.  Candor and Fairness. 
The conduct of the lawyer before the Court and with other lawyers should be 
characterized by candor and fairness. 
It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the contents of a paper, 
the testimony of a witness, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, 
or the language of a decision or a textbook; . . . or in argument to assert as a 
fact that which has not been proved, or . . . to mislead his opponent by 
concealing or withholding positions in his opening argument upon which his 
side then intends to rely. 
It is unprofessional and dishonorable to deal other than candidly with the facts 
in taking the statements of witnesses, in drawing affidavits and other 
documents, and in the presentation of causes . . . .121 
Other canons provide related, reinforcing mandates,122 and a catchall, 
Canon 32, expressed the ideal of legal professionalism—that is, service as 
agent for a principal—but tempered by responsibility to the legal system and 
to the public it serves: “[A]bove all a lawyer will find his highest honor in a 
 
 120. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908) http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/Canons_Ethics.authcheckdam.pdf (emphasis added). 
 121. Id. Canon 22 (emphasis added). 
 122. Such canons include: 
Canon 18. Treatment of Witnesses and Litigants.  
The client cannot be made the keeper of the lawyer’s conscience in professional matters . . . .  
Improper speech is not excusable on the ground that it is what the client would say if speaking in his 
own behalf . . . .  
Canon 29. Upholding the Honor of the Profession. 
Lawyers should expose without fear or favor before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest 
conduct in the profession . . . . 
Canon 41. Discovery of Imposition and Deception.  
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been practiced, which has unjustly 
imposed upon the court or a party, he should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client, 
and if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he should promptly inform 
the injured person or his counsel, so that they may take appropriate steps. 
Id. Canons 18, 29, 41 (emphasis added). 
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deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an 
honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.”123  The call for attorneys to 
conduct themselves under ethical principles that include honesty is clear. 
Historians of the ABA Canons concur that the committee of its drafters 
“was not writing on a clean slate, but was building on nineteenth-century 
scholarship as well as ethics codes adopted by state bar associations.”124  
Bar organizations in American states and cities date back to the decades after 
the Civil War, and one of those organizations, the Alabama Bar Association 
was the first one to adopt a set of legal ethics.125  At the insistence of Judge 
Thomas Goode Jones, the Alabama Bar Association in 1880 adopted its set 
of ethical precepts and “much of Jones’ material was adapted into [the 
American Bar] Association’s Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908.”126  
Those include obligations and precepts requiring or urging lawyers to be 
honest in their provision of legal services to clients.127 
I continued researching in reverse chronological order, looking earlier 
into the nineteenth century in search of texts that might illuminate the issue 
of lawyer honesty in the ages of Bierce and Bentham.  Bar associations were 
few after the early Federal period and before the Civil War.  Some states 
required honesty or honest character of men wishing to be admitted to the 
practice of law by action of the courts.  But according to one scholar, 
By the early 19th century, most states required only a general oath of office 
that did not state individual ethical principles . . . .  This meant that lawyers 
were largely unregulated during the first half of the 19th century, at least in 
terms of formal standards of professional conduct.128 
Nonetheless there were, even then, pertinent ethical texts directed, and 
 
 123. Id. Canon 32. 
 124. Keith R. Fisher, Repudiating the Holmesian “Bad Man” Through Contextual Ethical Reasoning: The 
Lawyer as a Steward, 2008 J. PROF. L. 13, 16 (2008). 
 125. See generally Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State 
Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471, 472 (1998) (asserting the widely-recognized primacy of Alabama’s 
code of ethics, as it was “the first code of ethics for lawyers officially adopted in the United States”). 
 126. David I. Durham, A Call for the Regulation of the Profession, in GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: 
ESSAYS ON THOMAS GOODE JONES’ 1887 CODE AND THE REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION 1, 4–
5 (2003). 
 127. ALA. CODE OF ETHICS R. 5 (1887), reproduced in HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS App. F 
at 354 (1953) (“The utmost candor and fairness should characterize the dealings of attorneys with the 
courts and with each other.” (emphasis added)).  
 128. Carol Rice Andrews, The Lasting Legacy of the 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar 
Association, in GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS ON THOMAS GOODE JONES’ 1887 CODE AND 
THE REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION 7, 11 (2003). 
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generally available, to attorneys.129 
One notable development that contributed to the developing 
professionalization over the course of the nineteenth century was the rise of 
case reporters and legal journals.130  Commentators and jurists published 
lectures in those publications that, among other topics, promulgated 
maxims and exhortations specifically addressing and dealing with questions 
of lawyer ethics, including the obligation of a lawyer to be truthful.131 
George Sharswood (1810–1833)132 was a key figure whose antebellum 
practice commentaries and ethical admonitions to young lawyers, including 
an insistence on honesty, had widespread influence and whose work 
subsequently inspired and informed the later promulgation of rules of legal 
ethics by the Alabama Bar and other bar organizations.133  Sharswood was 
a Pennsylvania trial court judge, a professor of law at the University of 
Pennsylvania, and ultimately a chief justice of that state’s supreme court.134  
In 1854, while a trial judge, he delivered lectures to the law students at that 
university, and those were collected and published under the title, A Compend 
of Lectures on the Aims and Duties of the Profession of Law, Delivered Before the Law 
Class of the University of Pennsylvania,135 and republished several times in the 
following three decades.136 
Sharswood began his lectures with a recitation of the oath of admission 
to the practice of law in Pennsylvania, which, in a footnote, he traced back 
to an act of the colonial assembly in 1752.137  The oath included, in 
pertinent part, the promise “to behave himself in the office of attorney 
 
 129. See id. at 7, 11 (“[A]cademics and prominent lawyers in the mid-19th century frequently 
expounded on the appropriate standards of conduct for lawyers.”). 
 130. See Richard A. Danner, More than Decisions: Reviews of American Law Reports in the Pre-West Era, 
DUKE L. SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 2 (2015), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=6172&context=faculty_scholarship (analyzing the history of early American reporters and 
specialized legal journals and their effect on the legal community). 
 131. See Andrews, supra note 128, at 12–13 (2003) (listing the topics covered by the academic 
discourses and law school lectures of David Hoffman and George Sharswood). 
 132. Penn Biographies: George Sharswood (1810-1883), U. PA., http://www.archives.upenn.edu/
people/1800s/sharswood_geo.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
 133. See Andrews, supra note 128, at 13 (2003) (suggesting George Sharswood’s law school lecture 
was one of the most influential works during the mid-nineteenth century). 
 134. See id. (describing George Sharswood as “a “prominent lawyer, judge[,] and professor”); see 
also Penn Biographies, supra note 132 (indicating Sharswood served as chief justice of the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania for ten years). 
 135. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW (1854) [hereinafter A COMPEND OF LECTURES]. 
 136. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1860); GEORGE 
SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (3d ed. 1885). 
 137. A COMPEND OF LECTURES, supra note 135, at 10 (1854) (speaking of practices in the 
classroom). 
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according to the best of his learning and ability[;] . . . that he will use no 
falsehood . . . .”138  Sharswood explained “the claims of truth and honor [are 
among] the matters comprised in the [lawyer’s] oath of office.”139  Later in 
the lecture Sharswood amplified his advice along that line: 
It need hardly be added that a practitioner ought to be particularly cautious, 
in all his dealings with the court, to use no deceit, imposition, or evasion—to make no 
statements of facts [that] he does not know or believe to be true—to distinguish carefully 
what lies in his own knowledge from what he has merely derived from his 
instructions—to present no paper books intentionally garbled.140 . . . . 
His advice regarding the admonition continued, stating: “‘to use no 
falsehood[,]’ [i]t seems scarcely necessary to enforce this topic. Truth in all its 
simplicity—truth to the court, client, and adversary—should be indeed your polar 
star.”141  Sharswood gave examples, and the lecture included this practical 
reason for an attorney to conduct himself honestly: 
The client will be often required, in the course of a cause, to make affidavits 
of various kinds.  There is no part of his business with his client, in which a 
lawyer should be more cautious, or even punctilious, than this.  He should be 
careful lest he incur the moral guilt of subornation of perjury, if not the legal 
offence.142 
That is, the attorney will behave morally—and will avoid criminal 
liability—by being honest, according to Sharswood.143  His published 
lectures were widely read and reprinted, as well as very influential.144 
 
 138. Id. at 10 (emphasis added). 
 139. Id. (emphasis added). 
 140. Id. at 21–22 (emphasis added). 
 141. Id. at 94 (emphasis added). 
 142. Id. at 46–47 (emphasis added). 
 143. See id. at 47 (“He should be careful lest he incur the moral guilt of subornation of perjury, if not the 
legal offence.”). 
 144. In an 1855 review of the book, a reviewer noted: 
The office of [p]residing [j]udge of the [d]istrict [c]ourt, for our great city, in which so large a mass 
of diversified business is constantly transacted, and where, in almost every possible manner, each 
member of the bar must present himself, affords the author[, Sharswood,] the opportunity . . . of 
perceiving every failure in truth or rectitude, and usually the motive of that failure and its character. 
Review of  SHARSWOOD’S PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, 3 AM. L. REG. 193, 193–94 (1855) (emphasis added) 
(book review).  The reviewer commented “Sharswood’s book probably ‘places higher the ordinary 
standard of a lawyer’s rectitude.’”  Id. at 195. 
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Among additional ethical commentators that have been identified by 
historians,145 the other truly prominent nineteenth-century advocate for 
lawyerly ethics was David Hoffman (1784–1854).146  He “founded the Law 
Institute at the University of Maryland” and authored the seminal book, A 
Course of Legal Study, the second edition of which (published in 1836) 
contained Hoffman’s pioneering effort to state maxims of ethical conduct 
for lawyers, his fifty “Resolutions in Regard to Professional 
Deportment.”147  In his Resolutions, which have been called “the earliest 
statement in the United States of lawyers’ professional ethics,”148 Hoffman 
advocated legal ethics based upon the lawyer’s own conscience: 
My client’s conscience and my own are distinct entities: and though my 
vocation may sometimes justify my maintaining as facts, or principles, in 
doubtful cases, what may be neither one nor the other, I shall ever claim the 
privilege of solely judging to what extent to go.149 
Other ethical considerations he sets forth include: (1) “What is morally 
wrong cannot be professionally right, however it may be sanctioned by time or 
custom”;150 (2) “In reading to the court or to the jury authorities, records, 
documents, or other papers, I shall . . . abstain from all false[] or deceptive 
readings”;151 and (3) “[T]here can be no efficient eloquence, unless the 
speaker be an honest man.”152  The prescriptions set forth in Hoffman’s 
Resolutions153 are less specific than Sharswood’s later lectures and focus 
more on a lawyer’s sense of honor154 than on honesty. Hoffman 
optimistically concluded: “With the aid of the[se] . . . Resolutions . . . [a 
lawyer may] hope to attain eminence in my profession, and to leave this 
 
 145. Such others include David Dudley Field, progenitor of the Field Codes, and George Paul 
Brown, the foremost antebellum criminal lawyer of Philadelphia, together lesser known lecturers to 
lawyers and law students and even funeral orators.  Michael H. Hoeflich, Preface to SOURCES OF THE 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LAW OF LAWYERING at xi, xii–xiv (Michael H. Hoeflich ed., 2007). 
 146. Andrews, supra note 128, at 11–12 (2003); Michael Ariens, Lost and Found: David Hoffman and 
the History of American Legal Ethics, 67 ARK. L. REV. 571, 571 (2014)) [hereinafter Lost and Found]. 
 147. Lost and Found, supra note 146 at 571–72. 
 148. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 277 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2002). 
 149. 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY: ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE 
PROFESSION GENERALLY, 755 (1836). 
 150. Id. at 765 (emphasis added). 
 151. Id. at 769–70 (emphasis added). 
 152. Id. at 740. 
 153. For a Hoffman contemporary who followed soon with similar thoughts, see generally Timothy 
Walker, Ways and Means of Professional Success, 1 W. L.J. 542, 546–47 (1844). 
 154. See Lost and Found, supra note 146 at 571–72 (analyzing how the concept of honor may have 
played a role in Hoffman being lost through history and subsequently rediscovered by American 
lawyers and legal scholars). 
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world with the merited reputation of having lived an honest lawyer.”155 
The upshot of my historical research was to find that, around the time of 
Bierce’s penning To an Insolent Attorney, at least the key national bar 
organization, the ABA, although representing only a minority of American 
lawyers, firmly took a position decrying dishonesty by lawyers.  And at the 
approximate time Bentham was criticizing certain British lawyers as 
“licensed liars,” Sharswood and Hoffman were articulating standards of 
honesty for American lawyers, and a little later, the Alabama Bar Association 
was adopting the first code of ethics by a lawyers’ organization.156  Thus, 
even in the nineteenth century, lawyers were subject to, and at least to certain 
extents constrained by, the admonitions and maxims—expressing norms of 
lawyer conduct—posited by important commentators, as well as by oaths 
taken upon admission to the bar, to be honest and not to mislead courts, 
opponents, or clients. 
C. In Abraham Lincoln’s “Honest Lawyer” Speech and in His Last Case 
At that point in my research, a friend pointed me to the law practice of 
that paragon of an American lawyer, Abraham Lincoln,157 and another 
friend provided an excerpt from a famous speech by him.  As a practicing 
lawyer, Lincoln had to deal with the antebellum public’s misperceptions and 
prejudices about lawyers and their honesty.158  In a Lincoln-authored 
document titled “Notes on the Practice of Law,” which seems to be the text of 
a speech from as early as 1850 or as late as 1859,159 Lincoln exhorted law 
students and prospective lawyers: 
There is a vague popular belief that lawyers are necessarily dishonest.  I say vague, 
because when we consider to what extent confidence, and honors are reposed 
 
 155. 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY: ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE 
PROFESSION GENERALLY, n. 100 at 775 (1836); see generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN 
LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1991) (stressing the 
importance of ethics to a lawyer that strives to achieve success and prominence in the legal field); Alito, 
supra note 108, at xxx–xxxi (discussing the importance of the works of David Hoffman and George 
Sharswood to the “emerging field of legal education” in the 1800s). 
 156. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908) http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/Canons_Ethics.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
 157. William T. Ellis & Billie J. Ellis, Jr., Competence, Diligence, and Getting Paid: Lincoln’s Lessons for 
Today’s Ethical Lawyer, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, ESQ.: THE LEGAL CAREER OF AMERICA’S GREATEST 
PRESIDENT 133 (Roger Billings & Frank J. Williams eds.). 
 158. FRANK CERESI, ABRAHAM LINCOLN’S LAW PRACTICE 116 (2012) (ebook) (discussing the 
public’s perceptions of lawyers and how Lincoln dealt with them). 
 159. Id. at 69.  
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in, and conferred upon lawyers by the people, it appears improbable that their 
impression of dishonesty is very distinct and vivid.  Yet the impression is 
common—almost universal.  Let no young man, choosing the law for a 
calling, for a moment yield to this popular belief.  Resolve to be honest at all events; 
and if, in your own judgment, you can not be an honest lawyer, resolve to be honest 
without being a lawyer.  Choose some other occupation, rather than one in the 
choosing of which you do, in advance, consent to be a knave.160 
This “‘honest lawyer’s passage,” according to Brian Dirck, a recent 
biographer who focused particularly on Lincoln’s legal career, “ties Lawyer 
Lincoln directly to Honest Abe, the man whose integrity has become the 
stuff of American legend.”161  Another recent biographer comments, 
“Lincoln’s reputation for honesty is well deserved,”162 and a third calls him 
“America’s secular saint.”163  These words of Lincoln’s speech have often 
been held up as an inspirational legal-ethical text164 and are frequently 
repeated by writers on topics of legal ethics.165  I was tempted to end this 
Article here. 
But in researching the Lincoln speech further, I found that his 
biographers and the legal-ethicists have overlooked one problematic case, 
or actually a series of cases in which Lincoln was counsel, or a member of a 
counsel group, occurring at the very end of his legal career, just before his 
nomination and election as President.166  A lawyer and legal historian, 
Marshall D. Hier, discovered this litigation in federal court in Illinois and 
related proceedings in Illinois state courts.  In several historical archives, he 
 
 160. Abraham Lincoln, “Notes on the Practice of Law,” quoted in THE PORTABLE ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN 35 (Andrew Delbanco ed., 1992). 
 161. Brian Dirck, Introduction to LINCOLN THE LAWYER at 1, 2 (2007). 
 162. JONATHAN W. WHITE, LINCOLN ON LAW, LEADERSHIP, AND LIFE 18 (2015). 
 163. Harold Holzer, Reassessing Lincoln’s Legal Career, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, ESQ.: THE LEGAL 
CAREER OF AMERICA’S GREATEST PRESIDENT (Roger Billings & Frank J. Williams eds. 2010); see also 
JOHN P. FRANK, LINCOLN AS A LAWYER 140 (1961) (“Lincoln the lawyer and Lincoln the candidate 
were in the highest degree the same man.”); Christopher Neff, Those Cunning Spiders, the Lawyers: In 
Search of an Antebellum Legal Ethos, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 317, 318 n.7 (2009) (“A perfected Lincoln is still 
held up as the ideal to which statesmen (and lawyers) should aspire.” (citations omitted)). 
 164. Frank Ceresi, editor of an edition of Lincoln’s speech, wrote in its introduction: 
[M]y opinion is that the Notes should not only hang proudly in every lawyer’s law office, but they 
should be required reading during the third year of every law school curriculum across the 
land . . . it should be the foundation of a course, right alongside . . . ethics, and studied for the 
nuggets that it reveals. 
FRANK CERESI, ABRAHAM LINCOLN’S LAW NOTES, 74 (2012) (ebook). 
 165. Searches through Google Scholar and HeinOnline demonstrate that this quotation has been 
featured in more than 180 law review articles. 
 166. Marshall D. Hier, “Honest Abe”? Lincoln’s Legal Ethics in Blakeman v. Phelps, 45 ST. LOUIS B.J. 
48 (1998–1999) (outlining the series of events in which Lincoln became involved in the case).  
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found the revelatory correspondence among Lincoln and other Illinois 
lawyers who teamed in defending stockholders of a defunct railroad 
company against the claims of out-of-state creditors.167 
In his 1998 article, Hier asserted that Lincoln did not live up to his own 
admonishment of honesty in legal practice, as he engaged, in this instance: 
[V]ery questionable . . . maneuvers to thwart [the plaintiff].  Easily the most 
questionable of these maneuvers involved the deliberate misrepresentation in 
pleadings filed with the Illinois Supreme Court of the existence of a key lower 
court judgment, whereas neither that judgment nor the case in which it 
allegedly had been rendered had any basis in fact.168 
With the lawyers’ correspondence, he pieced together the story of the 
lawyering of this somewhat complicated matter. 
To begin, a St. Louis attorney, Daniel Jewett, represented a creditor of 
the railroad in a diversity-of-citizenship action in the federal circuit court in 
Illinois to collect an unpaid debt from one of the subscribing 
stockholders.169  Lincoln defended, but Jewett won this suit.170  Since the 
amount was too small to support an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, other 
counsel associated with Lincoln in the defense of the stockholders urged 
him to file a motion for a new trial in order to obtain a retrial and to buy 
time for a legal gambit.171 
Concocted by the other attorneys, the strategy hinged on Lincoln filing 
an appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court regarding another judgment—a 
state court judgment entered in Madison County in a suit brought by one of 
the stockholders against another “to collect a judgment [rendered in a 
different county, Bond County] for $110.00 supposedly rendered in favor 
of [the plaintiff] against the railroad . . . for his services in soliciting railroad 
stock subscription.”172  Lincoln’s participation in a false representation to 
a court is revealed in a letter from an ally of the group of railroad 
stockholders informing Lincoln that the ostensible plaintiff “had not 
previously sued the Company [in Bond County] but it was admitted that he 
had.”173  Letters from the associated lawyers informed Lincoln that the 
 
 167. Id. at 49. 
 168. Id. at 48. 
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 172. Id. at 49. 
 173. Id. (emphasis added). 
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strategy was for the new defendant to quickly confess a judgment in a state 
court in Madison County based on the fictitious prior judgment.174  Lincoln 
could then appeal it and, hopefully, secure a fast and favorable opinion of 
the state supreme court to cite to the federal court in which Lincoln’s 
motion for rehearing was pending.175 
The Madison County trial court granted the judgment as requested by 
Lincoln’s co-counsel based on the “convenient fiction” of an earlier 
judgment in the Bond County state court.176  When Lincoln then appealed 
the judgment, Jewett, the attorney for the winning plaintiff in the federal 
court action, learned what was happening and filed an amicus brief in the 
Illinois Supreme Court, pointing out that the supposed underlying judgment 
in Bond County was fictitious.177  But the state supreme court nonetheless 
overruled Jewett’s request to dismiss the case.178  At this point, Lincoln’s 
name disappeared from the papers of the case, as he moved into the political 
realm, and the appellate case was later settled, which Hier presumes was also 
“fictitious.”179 
Hier contends that “Lincoln’s willingness,” after having urged all lawyers 
to be “honest at all events” in his “honest lawyer” speech, “necessarily raises 
the issue of Lincoln’s own honesty as a lawyer.”180  Hier concludes “[t]he 
best argument that can be advanced in defense of Lincoln’s actions . . . is 
the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court, after considering [the] powerful 
arguments [that the appealed-from judgment was a ruse], still overruled 
the . . . motion to dismiss.”181  But in light of Lincoln’s “own high standard 
for attorney honesty in” the “‘honest lawyer’ speech” Hier concludes, 
somewhat reluctantly, “Lincoln seems to have fallen short.”182 
  
 
 174. See id. (reciting David Gillespie’s letter to Lincoln). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 50. 
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 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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 182. Id.  Whether Lincoln’s involvement in Phelps v. Blakeman was the result of situational pressures 
or a simple human failing cannot be answered here.  One Lincoln biographer does note: “Like other 
members of the bar, Lincoln could ill-afford to be finicky about clients; there were simply too many 
lawyers and too few clients.”  1 MICHAEL BURLINGAME, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A LIFE 253 (2008).  Of 
course, we should be mindful that “the past is a foreign country.”  DAVID LOWENTHAL, THE PAST IS 
A FOREIGN COUNTRY: REVISITED 3 (1985) (using the opening line of the novel THE GO-BETWEEN: 
“The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there.” (quoting L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO-
BETWEEN 17 (1953))).  As a historian has cautioned, “[L]ife back then was based on ways of being and 
believing incommensurable with our own.”  LOWENTHAL, supra, at xiv (1985). 
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V. UNDERSTANDING THE ETHICAL REQUIREMENT OF ATTORNEY 
HONESTY 
A. Lawyering Within the Ethical Requirement of Lawyer Truthfulness in the 
Twenty-First Century 
My research ended on the sour note of learning of Lincoln’s involvement 
in a false pretense upon which a court acted in reliance.  It was a reminder 
that, of course, some lawyers do lie from time to time in their practice on 
behalf of clients.183  As two astute commentators have observed: 
Surely some attorneys do deliberately engage in conduct that they know to be 
wrong in order to benefit themselves or their client.  However, psychological 
research suggests a more complex story: that those who commit ethical 
infractions are not necessarily “bad apples,” but are human beings.  Many 
ethical lapses result from a combination of situational pressures and all too 
human modes of thinking.184 
I had otherwise reached the conclusion that the phrase “licensed liar” is 
an unjustified epithet, an allegation that is just wrong.  American lawyering, 
today as well as at the time of Bentham, Lincoln, and Bierce, occurs within 
limits, with the boundaries set by, today, the ethical rules of the jurisdictions 
in which a licensed attorney practices or, in the nineteenth century, within 
the parameters of the maxims, admonitions, precepts, and aspirations 
articulated by significant jurists and legal commentators, including Lincoln, 
as well as by the governance of court proceedings by judges, all imposing or 
fostering an imperative to speak truthfully, to be honest, and not to 
intentionally mislead courts, opponents, or clients. 
The fuller conclusion is this: despite legal ethics, individual attorneys can 
and do, on occasion, transgress the rules by lying on behalf of clients, and 
some may lie to their clients, but such conduct is not with the permission or 
sanction of any sort or form of professional authorization.  A licensed 
 
 183. See Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 209, 217 (2014) (“I don’t see why we should not come out roundly and say that 
one of the functions of a lawyer is to lie for his client . . . .  A lawyer is required to be disingenuous.” 
(quoting Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 9 (1951))).  This is also true of 
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 184. Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 
1111 (2013). 
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attorney is simply not authorized or permitted by the licensing agencies and the 
state and federal courts to lie to clients, adversaries, or courts.  And if those 
professional standards are breached, penalties are at least potentially 
assessable. 
As noted earlier, “lawyering” is the work of the lawyer to 
invoke[] and manipulate[], or advise[] about, the dispute-resolving or 
transaction-effectuating processes of the legal system for the purpose of 
solving a problem or causing a desired change in, or preserving, the status quo 
for his or her [client].185 
Lawyering, under this definition, is the work of an attorney to find a way 
to achieve the goal desired by the client.  Lawyering is difficult work.  Clients 
hire lawyers to obtain a result that the clients desire. 186  Usually, clients do 
not hire lawyers based on the lawyer’s personal morality—whether his 
morality is based on religion or philosophy—but rather based on the 
expectation that the lawyer is capable of achieving the objective of the client.  
Most clients do not generally care if the lawyer breaks minor procedural 
rules187 or lives up to a moral standard in her personal life, so long as the 
goal of the client is attained.  The lawyer operates and lives within a set of 
tensions created by the client’s expectations, the popular conception of the 
lawyer encapsulated in the phrase “licensed liar,” and the reality of the 
constraints of professional ethical rules about honesty188—violations of 
 
 185.  Daniel, supra note 32, at 215; see also Lawyering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(explaining the meaning of the word “lawyering” as it relates to the work and skill needed in the field). 
 186. There is, for only one example, “cause lawyering,” in which the lawyer finds or takes on a 
client in pursuit of a broader social or political goal, where “primary loyalty is [often] not to clients, to 
constitutional rights, nor to legal process but to a vision of the good society.”  CAUSE LAWYERING: 
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 7 (Austin Sarat & Stuart 
Scheingold eds., 1998); Felice Batlan, The Ladies’ Health Protective Association: Lay Lawyers and Urban Cause 
Lawyering, 41 AKRON L. REV. 701, 705 (2008). 
 187. Legal ethics do not now and have not, by my research, ever required that a lawyer refrain 
from bending or occasionally breaking nonsubstantive or procedural rules from time to time in pursuit 
of the goal of the client.  I have written of a classic example in LBJ v. Coke Stevenson whereby Johnson’s 
lawyers ignored the rules for seeking Supreme Court review and bluffed a clerk into accepting their 
filing.  See Josiah M. Daniel, III, LBJ v. Coke Stevenson: Lawyering for Control of the Disputed Texas Democratic 
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disregarding the rules by ignoring the deputy clerk’s protests that he could not accept a motion to stay, 
and “toss[ing] the motion on the desk, stat[ing] that he was ‘effectuating a lodgment,’ depart[ing], and 
wait[ing] to see what happened”).  It may or may not be a good idea tactically to breach one of the 
rules of procedure, but those rules or associated case law themselves provide or illustrate remedies, and 
it is neither necessary nor appropriate to allege attorney dishonesty when for tactical reasons a lawyer 
bends one of them. 
 188. See DAVIS, supra note 37, at 9 (using the phrase “licensed liar” to describe attorneys).  An 
excellent practical guide to the varieties of issues of honesty and specific solutions and approaches to 
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which can have real, painful consequences. 
Legal scholars continue to debate the normative role of disciplinary 
rules.189  “Lawyers make ethical decisions primarily based on two 
considerations: a cost-benefit analysis or an individualistic moral basis,” 
writes one law student.190  Yet whether the lawyer is acting as a “neutral 
partisan”191 or is pursuing client representation based on the attorney’s 
own personal moral code,192 and even though the ethical rules “remain a 
mixture of hortatory and concrete mandates, some never enforced, most 
rarely enforced, and none universally enforced,”193 if an attorney strays 
outside the boundaries of the rules by lying, he risks subjecting himself to 
the imposition of professional discipline by the organized bar’s 
enforcement apparatus.194  As Samuel Dash has written, 
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 192. See id. at 31–32 (“Some of this literature argues that lawyers compromise their clients’ 
interests in order to advance their own interests.”); see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN 
ETHICAL STUDY 56 (1988) (contending lawyers seek to excuse their behavior by appealing to their role 
in a social institution—in this case the adversary system—yet “[t]he principle of 
nonaccountability . . . is false, and the principle of partisanship holds only . . . when lawyers are held 
morally accountable for the means they use and the ends they pursue”). 
 193. Fred C. Zacharias, Steroids and Legal Ethics Codes: Are Lawyers Rational Actors?, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 671, 672 (2010). 
 194. See Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm 
of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 223–24 (1993) (“The recent adoption of the ABA’s 
Modern Rules has been followed with a series of further proposals designed to control specific lawyer 
conduct.”).  For instance, one Texas lawyer was suspended from practice for five years due to his 
actions: 
[He] falsified evidence and knowingly used evidence that he knew to be false, delayed the 
resolution of a legal matter, committed a criminal act, and engaged in conduct involving 
dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation . . . [and] violated Rules 1.01(b)(1), 1.02(a)(2), 1.03(a) and 
(b), 1.04(d), 1.15(a)(3), 3.02, 3.03(a)(5), 3.04(b), and 8.04(a)(2) and (a)(3). He was ordered to pay 
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All lawyers should have integrity, should be honest and should not 
misrepresent.  The rules of professional conduct mandate that lawyers have 
such integrity.  But that isn’t based on moral standards, it’s based on 
prohibitions that are backed up by legal and professional sanctions . . . .195 
The overriding, fundamental reality is that prevarication by practicing 
attorneys is simply not permitted by the rules, including the mandate for 
honesty, and violations do, or can, have consequences.  The guiding and 
controlling element of professional ethics prohibits and inhibits an attorney 
from lying in her work for the client. 
The public has difficulty understanding these matters including the 
subtleties of bar rules196 and frequently leaps to the worst conclusion.197  
Marc Galanter analyzed a plethora of popular stories and jokes—old and 
new—about lawyers and found that many “play[] on the similarity of the 
sounds of ‘liar’ and ‘lawyer.’”198  Similarly, legal historian Lawrence M. 
Friedman noted: 
The general public certainly has no illusions about the profession.  Indeed, 
quite the contrary: according to survey data, people have a very low opinion 
of lawyers.  A December 2006 Gallup poll asked people to rate the “honesty 
and ethical standards” of different occupations.  Eighty-four percent of the 
respondents rated nurses “high or very high,” and dentists received 62 
percent.  Lawyers, by contrast, received a dismal 18 percent. In a Harris poll 
that asked whether various types of people could be trusted to “tell the truth,” lawyers did 
even worse; at 27 percent, they were at the very bottom of the list, outranking only 
actors at 26 percent.199 
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Thus the popular mind continues to believe what the stranger at the bar 
alleged in his two words: that lawyers are indeed “licensed liars” who 
willingly prevaricate in the service of clients in order to make fees.  This 
popular prejudice does exist; as Lincoln noted, “the impression is common, 
almost universal.”200 
B. Replying to the Stranger in the Bar 
I have chosen to be a lawyer, and after thirty-eight years in the practice of 
law, I continue to subscribe to the professional ethic of honesty in my work 
on behalf of clients.  Lincoln’s aspirational “honest lawyer” speech—not his 
conduct on behalf of clients in the Blakeman v. Phelps case—furnishes my 
answer to the stranger in the bar in Santa Fe.  I know that my client expects 
and desires my best lawyering in order to obtain a good and valuable result.  
But good lawyering should never be dishonest. 
While from time to time specific practitioners cross the line and violate 
the ethic of honesty, the phrase “licensed liar” is just an epithet.  When it is 
uttered in reference to the entirety of the American bar or to an individual 
lawyer whom the speaker characterizes an undifferentiated representative of 
that entirety, that epithet is unwarranted. 
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